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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

KHALID KHAWAR,
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)
)

V.

)
)

GLOBE INTERNATIONAL,

INC.,

)
)

Defendant

and /^pellant.
"

)
)

APPELLANT'S BRIEF ON THE MERITS
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Preliminary Statement
On March 14, 1990 Khalid Iqbal Khawar filed an amended
complaint for damages against Globe International, Inc.,
Roundtable Publishing, Inc., and Robert Morrow in Los Angeles
Superior Court.

(C.T. 137.)

Khawar's claim against Globe was

for libel stemming from an article Globe published on April 4,
1989.

(C.T. 139.)
With regard to Khawar's claim, the jury found:

article was of and concerning Khawar;

1

(1) that the

(2) that the article

contained false and defamatory statements about Khawar;
Khawar was a private figure;

(3) that

(4) that Globe published the

defamatory material either knowing that it was false, or with
reckless disregard as to the truth of the charges;

(5) that

Globe published the article with malice or oppression towards
Khawar;

and (6) the article was an neutral and accurate report

of the charges made by Morrow.

(C.T. 2780-83.)

The court

awarded Khawar a total of $1,175,000 in damages, including an
award of $500,000 for punitive damages.

(C.T. 2783, 2791.)

The trial court upheld all of the jury's findings, except
V

the court determined that the Globe article was not an accurate
and neutral report.

(R.T. 2740.)

The basis of the court's

decision was that the photo in the article was lighter and larger
than the same picture in the book.

(R.T. 2744.)

The court

stated that because Khawar was identifiable only in Globe's
picture, this constituted original libel.

(R.T. 2744.)

In spite

of the fact that Khawar offered no evidence on this point, the
court stated that the jury would have decided differently had
Khawar offered such evidence.

(R.T. 2743.)

The trial court entered judgment in favor of Khawar on April
15, 1994.

(C.T. 3310.)

Globe appealed, and the Second District

Court of Appeal upheld the trial court.

Khawar v. Globe Int'l,

Cal. App. 4th 14 (1996), review granted September 25,
1996 {S046116).

The appellate court held:

(1) that the trial

court properly determined that Khawar was a private figure;

2

(2)

that California has not adopted the neutral reportage privilege;
and (3)

that the jury's finding of malice was supported by

substantial evidence.

See Khawar,

51 Cal, App. 4th at 14.

This

Court accepted Globe's petition for review on September 25, 1996.
(C.T. X.)
Statement of Facts
Khawar testified that he was at the Ambassador Hotel to take
photographs on the night Robert Kennedy was killed, June 4, 1968.
{R.T. 1338.)

Khawar gave his camera to another man, and went to

the podium to pose near Kennedy moments before the Senator was
shot.

(R.T. 1339-40.)

The police and the FBI interviewed Khawar

after the assassination, and he gave his name as Khalid Iqbal to
both agencies.

(R.T. 1381.)

Pakistan on November 6, 1968.

Khawar left the country for
(R.T. 1351.)

A woman subsequently

identified Khawar as ''Ali Ahmand" from a Time magazine photo,
according to a December 2, 1968 FBI report.

(R.T.1401.)

Khawar attempted to sell pictures he took the night Kennedy
was killed to

magazine.

(R.T. 1394-95.)

Khawar saw himself

on television year in and year out on programs concerning the
Kennedy assassination, and he had videotape of the footage.
(R.T. 1393.)

Time magazine published a picture of Khawar

intentionally posing near Robert Kennedy on the podium.
1392.)

(R.T.

Khawar kept a copy of this same picture in his office,

which he often showed to family, friends, and

3

employees.

(R.T.

1357-58.)

Khawar estimated that "at least a couple thousand"

people had seen the picture.

(R.T. 1359.)

In a book titled RFK Must Die, Robert Blair Kaiser
questioned the identity of Khawar, why he had been so close to
Kennedy, and why he had not been interviewed in Pakistan.
1409.)

(R.T.

Subsequently, Morrow wrote a book in 1988 entitled The

Senator Must Die: The Murder of Robert F. Kennedy, in which he
argued that Sirhan Sirhan did not kill Kennedy, and that the
murderer was actually a Mafia hit man named Ali Ahmand.
143-44.)

(R.T.

Morrow's book contained photographs that he purported
V

to be "photographs of Ali Ahmand".

(R.T. 156, 162-63.)

However,

the photographs were actually pictures of Khawar standing on a
podium next to Robert Kennedy just before his assassination,
(R.T. 2743.)
On April 4, 1989, Globe published a report entitled "Former
CIA agent claims: IRANIANS KILLED BOBBY KENNEDY FOR THE MAFIA."
(C.T. 3145.)

The report covered the contents of Morrow's book,

including the allegations that Robert Kennedy was killed by Ali
Ahmand.

(C.T. 3145.)

The article contained one of the pictures

of Khawar and Kennedy from the book with an arrow pointing to
Khawar, indicating that he was the roan that Morrow claimed
assassinated Robert Kennedy.

(C.T. 3145.)

Globe never referred

to any person named Khalid Khawar, but instead named Ali Ahmand
as the man in the photograph that Morrow claimed assassinated
Robert Kennedy.

(C.T. 3145.)

4

I

Of the eighteen paragraphs in the report, fifteen contained
language such as "a former CIA agent charges," "Morrow claims,"
or "he says," which indicated that they were Morrow's claims.
(C.T. 3145.)

Of the three remaining paragraphs of the report,

two were direct quotations from Morrow,

(R.T. 1104.), and the

third contained only undisputed facts about the assassination.
(C.T. 3145.)

Even the caption under the photograph attributed

the charges to Morrow.

I

(C.T. 3145.)

5

I.

I

QUESTIONS PRESENTED
1.

Did Khawar's intentional actions, the circumstances
surrounding the Robert Kennedy assassination, and the
publication of Robert Morrow's book indicating Khawar was the
assassin, make Khawar a limited purpose public figure?

2.

Did Khawar meet the substantial burden of showing that Globe
published its article with actual malice?

3.

Should this Court adopt the constitutional doctrine of the
neutral reportage privilege in libel actions?

4.

Does the neutral reportage privilege apply to Globe's
republication of Morrow's charges?

6

i

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
4

Khawar is an involuntary public figure for the limited
purpose of the controversy around the assassination of Robert
Kennedy.

\

Khawar's affirmative actions, the subsequent

publication of a photograph of Khawar standing near the Senator
just before his assassination, and the publicity surrounding the
event made Khawar an involuntary public figure.
Because a public figure must prove actual malice to recover
damages for libel, Khawar must meet this requirement.

Even

private figure plaintiffs must prove actual malice to recover
>•

punitive damages.

To prove actual malice, a plaintiff must show

that the statements were published with knowledge that they were
false, or with reckless disregard as to their truth or falsity.
The evidence Khawar presented at trial is only sufficient to
support a finding of negligence, which is not probative of actual
malice.

Khawar's evidence was insufficient to prove actual

malice, therefore the award of punitive damages must be reversed.
Moreover, because Khawar is an involuntary public figure, this
Court must reverse the award of actual damages.
Additionally, Globe is protected by the neutral reportage
privilege, which the United States and California Constitutions
compel this Court to adopt.

This privilege applies to the

neutral and accurate republication of charges which are against a
public figure and which concern a newsworthy controversy.

At

trial, the jury concluded the Globe report was a neutral and

I

7

Khawar is

accurate statement of the accusations against Khawar.

a limited purpose public figure for the controversy around
Kennedy's assassination, and this controversy is newsworthy.

The

Globe report meets all parts of the neutral reportage privilege.
For all the reasons discussed above, this Court should overturn
the lower court decision.
ARGUMENT
I.

KHAWAR'S PRESENCE AT THE PODIUM, THE EVENTS SUBSEQUENT TO
THE ASSASSINATION OF ROBERT KENNEDY, AND THE PUBLICATION OF
MORROW'S BOOK HAVE MADE KHAWAR A PUBLIC FIGURE.
The question of whether a person is a public figure or not

is a question of law that must be reviewed ^ novo.

See Wolston

V. Reader's Digest Ass'n, 578 F.2d 427, 429 (D.C. Cir. 1978),
rev'd on other grounds, 443 U.S. 167 (1979).
A.

The United States Supreme Court created three
different categories of public figures that must show
actual malice to recover in a libel suit.

In 1964, The United States Supreme Court concluded that the
press has a privilege in holding that a "public official" could
not recover damages for libel unless he proved actual malice by
the defendant.
(1964).

New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279

Later the Court extended this protection to charges

against all "public figures."
U.S. 130, 154 (1967).

Curtis Publ'q Co. v. Butts, 388

In 1974, the Court laid out three classes

of public figures, explaining who was and how one became a public
figure.

See Gertz v. Welch, 418 U.S. 323, 345 (1974).

8

The first type of public figure, general purpose public
figures, are those people that "occupy positions of such
persuasive power and influence that they are deemed public
figures for all purposes." Gertz, 418 U.S. at 345.

Khawar does

not occupy such a position in society and is not a general
purpose public figure.
The second and most common group of public figures
established in Gertz are those "that have thrust themselves" into
the public spotlight in a particular area or controversy.

Id.

These people become limited purpose public figures for this
V-

"limited range of issues."

Id. at 351.

The final category of public figures Gertz created is termed
the involuntary limited purpose public figure.

Id. at 345.

These people become public figures "through no purposeful action
of" their own.

Id.

The Gertz court did caution that involuntary

public figures would have to be "exceedingly rare."

Id.

Because

Khawar's acts placed him in the center of such an important
event, he became an involuntary limited purpose public figure.
B.

The circumstances surrounding the Robert Kennedy
assassination had the cumulative effect of making
Khawar one of the rare cases of a person becoming an
involuntary public figure.
1.

Although the cases of involuntary public
figures have turned out to be rare as the Gertz
court predicted, there have been cases clearly
indicating when such a finding is appropriate.

Courts did not use the Gertz involuntary public figure
category until 1985, when the District of Columbia Circuit Court

(

9

directly faced the issue.

See Dameron v. Washington Magazine_^

Inc., 779 F.2d 736 (D.C. Cir. 1985), cert, denied, 476 U.S. 1141
(1988).

Dameron was an air traffic controller on duty when an

airliner crashed, killing most of the passengers.
738.

See

at

The crash drew a large amount of press coverage, and a

large scale investigation into the reasons for the accident.
id. at 742.

See

Authorities interviewed Dameron in the course of the

investigation, and the press used his name frequently in reports
on the accident.

See id.

The court found that through "sheer

bad luck" and "no desire of his own" Dameron had become a public
V

figure on the limited subject of the accident, and was thus a
rare example of an involuntary public figure.

Id. at 742-43.

After Dameron, court findings of involuntary public figure
status have been uncommon, with most of these courts relying on
Dameron for support.

See, e. q., Bay View Packing Co^—y_^—Taf

543 N.W.2d 522, 532-33 (Wis. Ct. App. 1995.)

Although the

instances of cases holding a plaintiff to be an involuntary
public figure are rare, there are several cases that apply the
reasoning of Dameron.

See, e.g., Naantaanbuu v.—Abernathy/

F. Supp. 218, 223 (S.D.N.Y. 1993)(Distinguishing Dameron in that
Dameron had been dragged into the controversy from the start,
whereas Naantaanbuu was dragged in 25 years latef).

These courts

adopt the reasoning of Dameron, while distinguishing on the basis
of dissimilar facts.

See, e.g» > id.

10

I

There is a second line of cases that hold plaintiffs to be
limited purpose public figures.

See, e.g., Wieqel v. Capital

Times Co., 426 N.W.2d 43, 51 (Wis. Ct. App. 1988).

These courts

found that the plaintiffs had made affirmative actions that,
although not intended to draw attention, inevitably led to
attention because of the extraneous circumstances.
id. at 50.

See, e.g.,

The Wieqel court was faced with a situation in which

the public controversy at issue was soil conservation and
erosion.
land.

See id.

Wiegel was the owner of the largest local plot of
The court found that it was inevitable for Wiegel

to be involved in the public controversy, and held that he was a
limited purpose public figure.

See id. at 50-51.

In Rosanova v.

Playboy Enters., 580 F.2d 859 (5th Cir. 1978), the court found
Mr, Rosanova to be a limited purpose public figure because his
actions, associating with known members of organized crime, were
"bound to invite attention and comment."

Id. at 861.

The difference between this line of cases and the Dameron
holding is that these cases did not specifically find the
plaintiffs to be involuntary public figures.
426 N.W.2d at 50.

See, e.g., Wj^egel,

Rather, the courts found that the plaintiffs

made affirmative acts bound to attract attention.

See, _e., id.

This shows the line between involuntary public figure status and
the acts necessary to be a voluntary public figure to be quite
narrow.

I

11

A different reasoning by several other courts supported
findings of involuntary public figure status.

See, e. g. /

Mirror Co. v. Superior Court, 198 Cal. App. 3d 1420
(1988)(dissenting opinion), cert, dismissed, 489 U.S. 1094
(1989) .

In Times Mirror, the court did not hold the plaintiff to

be a public figure simply because she discovered the body of a
murder victim.

at 1433.

However, the dissent argued that

the discovery of the body should have made the plaintiff an
involuntary public figure.

See id. at 1435.

The dissent focuses

on situations involving crime in saying "'[t]hose who commit
crime or are accused of it may not only not seek publicity but
may make every possible effort to avoid it, but they are
nevertheless persons of public interest.'"

Id. at 1435 (quoting

Restatement (Second) of Torts § 652D cmt. f (1965)).

"'The same

is true as to those who are the victims of crime or are so
unfortunate as to be present when it is committed .

.

.

[t]he

persons are regarded as properly subject to the public interest
and thus become involuntary public figures.

Id.

Other courts have relied on the Restatement in finding their
plaintiffs to be involuntary public figures.

See,

v. Chronicle, 154 Cal. App. 3d 1040, 1049 (1984).

Sipple
See also

Virgil v. Time, Inc., 527 F.2d 1122, 1129 (9th Cir. 1975), cert_.
denied, 425 U.S. 998 (1976).

Sipple grabbed the arm of a man who

was attempting to assassinate President Ford, and the press
praised Sipple as a hero.

See Sipple, 154 Cal. App. 3d at 1043-

12

44.

Several later articles referred to Sipple as both a hero and

a proud gay man.

See Sipple, 154 Cal. App. 3d at 1043-44.

The

Sipple court found the plaintiff to be an involuntary public
figure using the logic found in the Restatement.

Id. at 1049.

Sipple became an involuntary public figure simply by being
unfortunate to be present where a crime was attempted.

See id.

These cases differ from Wieqel in that they specifically
found their plaintiffs to be involuntary public figures.

See id.

Without relying on voluntary acts of the plaintiffs that
inevitably led to attention, these courts found that the
"involuntary public figure is passive and conducts no activities
that could reasonably be held to invite public attention."
Schiavone Constr. Co. v. Time, Inc., 847 F.2d 1069, 1079 (3d Cir.
1988).

Involuntary limited purpose public figures may have made

voluntary acts that put them in a position that would draw
attention, or they can be people who made no affirmative acts
whatsoever.
Another much more expansive area of involuntary public
figures include friends and family of public figures.
v. Allied News Co., 529 F.2d 206 (7th Cir. 1988).

See Carson

Although all

the plaintiffs in Carson had stipulated to public figure status,
the court stated that "one can assume that the wife of a public
figure such as [Johnny] Carson more or less automatically becomes
at least a part-time public figure herself."

Id. at 210.

Several courts have held that relatives of famous people are one
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(

true group of involuntary public figures.
^

See, e.g., Marcone v.

Penthouse Int'l Magazine For Men, 754 F.2d 1072, 1084 (3d Cir.
1985), cert, denied, 474 U.S. 864 (1985);

also Carlisle

Fawcett Publications, Inc., 201 Cal. App. 2d 733 (1962),
,

Although wives of famous people may have taken an affirmative
action, children of famous people have not.

In spite of this,

several courts have held children of famous people to be
involuntary public figures.

See, e.g. , Kapellas v. Kofman, 1

Cal. 3d 20, 37-8 (1969) .
Another court held that a close friend of Elizabeth Taylor
V
was a limited purpose public figure. See Wynberg v. National
Enquirer, 564 F. Supp. 924, 929 (C.D. Cal. 1982).

In Wynberg,

the plaintiff was an involuntary public figure relative to the
issue of his relationship with Elizabeth Taylor because he had
been "dragged unwillingly into a public controversy."

Thus,

involuntary public figure status can be sustained merely on the
plaintiffs relationship with a famous person.

Khawar's voluntary

.actions drew him into the public spotlight, strengthening his
status as an involuntary limited purpose public figure.
^*

Khawar's presence and conr^f> of action on the
night Robert Kennedy was a^^sassinated made
Khawar one of the rare cas<a<; of an involuntary
public figure.
^
------------------

Khalid Khawar could be an involuntary public figure just
from the unfortunate circumstance of having been photographed
within a few feet of Robert Kennedy just moments before the
assassination.

Khawar was extremely close to one of the most
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influential men of the time,
assassinated (R.T.

1338.)

just moments before that man was

Time magazine published a picture of

that moment for the entire country to see.

(R.T. 1392.)

Even absent the intentional actions on Khawar's part, he had
been dragged into the public spotlight.

It was Khawar in a

picture in Time that would be etched into the minds of countless
Americans, standing a few feet from Robert Kennedy just before
the assassination.

(R.T. 1392.)

Khawar was unfortunate to be

present when a crime of such magnitude was committed.

Even if

this Court ignores all of the affirmative actions taken by
V

Khawar, he has become an involuntary public figure.
However, it is impossible to ignore the many affirmative
actions that Khawar took on the night of the assassination.
Khawar gave his camera to a friend and intentionally got as close
to Kennedy on the podium as possible in order to have his picture
taken with the Senator.

(R.T. 1339-40.)

Khawar's friend

succeeded in taking the picture moments before the Senator was
assassinated.

(R.T. 1340.)

This chain of affirmative actions,

which eventually led to Khawar being dragged into a public
controversy, is impossible to ignore.

Khawar "voluntarily

engaged in a course that was bound to invite attention and
comment."

S^ Rosanova, 580 F.2d at 861.

Khawar's intentional

actions "almost inevitably put him into the vortex of a public
controversy."

See McDowell v. Paiewonsky, 769 F.2d 942, 950 (3d

Cir. 1985).
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I

Under the Wiegel analysis these intentional acts make Khawar
a voluntary limited purpose public figure.

There is little

difference in the substance of the voluntary acts made by Khawar
and those made by Wiegel.

See Wiegel, 426 N.W.2d at 50.

Following the reasoning of Wiegel and Rosanova, Khawar has made
substantial affirmative acts to become a voluntary limited
purpose public figure.

Id. at 50-51;

Rosanova, 580 F.2d at 861.

However, it would be hard for Khawar to have known what
would happen shortly after he made these intentional acts.

A

better argument is that these affirmative actions strengthen
Khawar's status as an involuntary public figure.

Khawar was

unfortunate to have been attempting to thrust himself in the line
of the cameras aimed at Robert Kennedy just before the Senator
was assassinated.

Just as “Dameron happened to be the controller

on duty at the time of the Mt. Weather crash," Damerori, 779 F.2d
at 742, so Khawar happened to be photographed with Robert Kennedy
on the night he was assassinated.

(R.T. 1339.)

Khawar did not

inject himself into the controversy, but as the Dameron court
stated, this "is not the be-all and end-all of public figure
status , . .

[p]ersons can become involved in public

controversies and affairs without their consent or will."
Dameron, 779 F.2d at 740-41.
Khawar attempted to "thrust himself into the public eye"
through his affirmative actions.
App. 4th 1183, 1190 (1994).

Rudnick v. McMillan, 25 Cal.

There is no need to examine whether

16

Khawar was successful in this attempt, for "it is not necessary
to show that a plaintiff actually achieves prominence ... it is
sufficient that ' [he] attempts to thrust himself into the public
eye.'"

Copp v. Paxton, 45 Cal. App. 4th 829, 845-46 (1996)

(quoting Rudnick, 25 Cal. App. 4th at 1190).

In short, Khawar

was unfortunate that he attempted to thrust himself into the
public eye moments before the assassination.

Therefore, Khawar

was dragged involuntarily into becoming a public figure.
3.

Under the Dameron analysis, Khawar is an
involuntary limited purpose public figure for
matters concerning the Kennedy assassination.
>•
The remarkable similarity of the facts involved in the case
at bar with those existing in Dameron indicate that Khawar is an
involuntary public figure.

Both Dameron and Khawar were

voluntarily at the places where the respective events occurred,
and both were working.

See Dameron, 779 F.2d at 741.

had anything to do with the respective incidents.

Neither

See id.

Authorities questioned both Dameron and Khawar, and the
authorities cleared both of any wrong doing.

See id. at 742.

The Dameron court distinguished its case from Time, Inc, v.
Firestone, 424 U.S. 448 (1976), in which the Court determined
that Mrs. Firestone was not a public figure merely because of her
highly publicized divorce proceedings.
454-55.

Firestone, 424 U.S. at

The Firestone court rested its decision on the fact that

just because the public was interested in her divorce, that did
not make it a public controversy.
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Id. at 454.

The Dameron court

I
easily distinguished this case, because the situation involved in
Dameron resulted in the loss of hundreds of lives in an airline
accident.

Dameron, 779 F.2d at 742.

The crash was a public

controversy that Dameron had been drawn into.
the death of Robert Kennedy is not a private matter.

Likewise,
The

assassination was a public controversy, and has remained so ever
since.

Therefore, the case at bar is distinguishable from

Firestone for the same reasons discussed in Dameron.
The Dameron court also distinguished its facts from Wolston
\T
------------

Reader's Digest Ass'n, 443 U.S. 157 (1979), in which the
~

V

plaintiff was found not to be a public figure for the libel
claimed.

Id. at 167.

In Wolston the court found that the libel

was not concerning the controversy for which the plaintiff could
arguably have been a limited purpose public figure.

I^

both

Dameron and the case at bar, the charges were concerning the
respective public controversies that each had been drawn into.
See Dameron, 779 F.2d at 742.
The most intriguing similarity between Dameron and the case
at bar is that the article involved in Dameron never mentioned
Dameron's name.

Id.

The article published by Globe also never

mentioned Khawar's name.

I

(C.T. 3145.)

The Dameron court noted

that 'Mi]f Dameron had not been previously linked with accounts
of the tragedy, no magazine reader could tie the alleged
defamation to Dameron.

*

Indeed it was partly because of the

defendant's public notoriety that he was identifiable at all from
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the oblique reference in The Washingtonian."
at 742.

Dameron, 779 F.2d

The only reference to Khawar in the article published by

Globe was a photograph over twenty years old which Morrow
purported to be a picture of Ali Ahmand.

(C.T. 3145.)

The only

way a reader could have connected the article to Khawar was if
they had been exposed to the photograph before.

This seems

possible only if Khawar himself had shown the reader the same
photograph in his office.

Therefore Khawar could not have been

identified in the article published by Globe without his own
personal "attempts to thrust himself into the public eye."
V

Rudnick, 25 Cal. App. 4th at 1190.
4.

The publication of Robert Morrow's book. The
Senator Must Die: The Murder of Robert F.
Kennedy, pulled Khawar into the public
spotlight, making him an involuntary public
figure.

Courts have held people to be public figures simply because
the press paid attention to them.

See Meeropol v. Nizer, 381

F.Supp. 29, 34 {S.D.N.Y. 1974), pet, denied, 508 F.2d 837 (2d
Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1013 (1978).

The Meeropol

court stated that the plaintiffs had been in the public spotlight
for much of their childhood.

Id.

"The activities of their

parents were monitored by book, magazine and newspaper [sic]
throughout the world.

As children of famous parents, they

achieved general fame or notoriety in the community."

Id.

The

Meeropol court based its holding on the sole fact that the press
had paid attention to the plaintiffs all of their lives.
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Id.

The court stated its reasoning when it said even though they

may

have renounced the public spotlight by changing their name
Meeropol, as children they were the subjects of considera
public attention."

Meeropol, 381 F. Supp. at 34.

Therefore, it

is possible to become an involuntary public figure through
other means than public attention.
Morrow's book was about a theory of how Robert Kennedy
been assassinated.

{C.T. 3145.)

Twenty nine years have passed,

but this event is still hotly debated and remains a public
controversy.

As discussed previously, Khawar s affirmative

actions placed him in the controversy surrounding that fatal
night.

The publication of Morrow's book may have finally made

Khawar an involuntary public figure, an event which had been
inevitable from the actions Khawar took twenty years earlier.
This is not to say that Khawar had become a public figure
and then ceased to be one because of a lapse of time, only to
regain that status because of the publication of the book.
"'[0]nce a man has become a public figure, or news, he remains a
matter of legitimate recall to the public mind to the end of his
days.'"

Forscher v. Buqliosi, 26 Cal. 3d 792, 810 (1980)

{quoting William L. Prosser, Privacy, 48 Cal. L. Rev. 383, 418
{I960)).
Khawar most likely became an involuntary public figure when
Kennedy was assassinated, or shortly thereafter.

If not, the

publication of Morrow's book was the final step in drawing Khawar
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into the public spotlight, making him an involuntary limited
purpose public figure.

Through "sheer bad luck," or through a

voluntary course of action that "inevitably put [him] into the
vortex of a public controversy," Khalid Khawar has become an
involuntary public figure for the limited purpose of the Kennedy
assassination.

See Dameron, 779 F.2d at 742-43;

McDowell, 769

F.2d at 950.
II.

KHAWAR HAS NOT MADE THE NECESSARY SHOWING OF ACTUAL MALICE
TO SUPPORT AN AWARD OF PUNITIVE DAMAGES.
A.

The question of whether there is sufficient evidence
to support an award of punitive damages in a libel
case must be reviewed de novo.

The United States Supreme Court created the requirement of
proving actual malice in libel cases involving public officials.
See New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279 (1964).
The Gertz court limited this holding to public figures, so that
private figures did not have to show actual malice to recover in
a libel action.

Gertz v. Welch, 418 U.S. 323, 324 (1974).

However, the Gertz court limited recovery in such cases to
"compensation only for actual injury."

Id.

While the Gertz

court left the states free to define their own standards of
liability, it restricted the states from permitting "recovery of
presumed or punitive damages when liability is not based on" a
showing of actual malice.

Id.

In 1985, the United States Supreme Court limited this
holding to allow recovery of presumed or punitive damages in some
situations.

See Dunn & Bradstreet, Inc, v. Greenmoss Builders,
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Incw 472 U.S. 749, 761 (1985).

The Court held that states could

allow awards of punitive and presumed damages without proof of
actual malice when the plaintiff is a private individual and the
libel at issue concerns a purely private matter.

See Dunn &

Bradstreet, 472 U.S. at 761.
In the Dunn S Bradstreet case, the libel involved a credit
report that was issued to very few people.

at 749.

Since

the credit report was not widely distributed and only concerned
the plaintiff's financial information, this was a purely private
matter.

at 762.

However, Khawar is making a claim regarding
V

an accusation that he is the assassin of Robert Kennedy.
139.)

(C.T.

Regardless of the truth or falsity of such an accusation,

the assassination of Robert Kennedy was and has continued to be a
very public matter, and theories as to the possible assassin have
been highly public matters.

The assassination of a presidential

candidate is not a purely private matter.

Therefore, proof of

actual malice is required to support an award of punitive
damages.

See Philadelphia Newspapers^—Inc. y_.—Hepps, 475 U.S.

767, 775 (1986).
In determining whether there was sufficient evidence to
support a finding of actual malice, the standard of review is ^
novo.

See Harte-Hanks Communications, Inc, v. Connaughton, 491

U.S. 657, 685 (1989).

Since courts cannot award punitive damages

in libel actions without proof of actual malice, the standard of
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review for the award of punitive damages is also ^ novo.

See

Harte-Hanks, 491 U.S. at 685.
B.

Khawar's evidence of actual malice is insufficient
and the award of punitive damages must be reversed.

The Sullivan Court described actual malice as a statement
made "with knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard
of whether it was false or not."

Sullivan^ 376 U.S. at 280.

Courts have broken down the standard into either requiring a
showing of ill will or hatred, or a showing that defendant acted
with reckless disregard of the truth.

See, e.g., Sanborn v.

Chronicle Publ'g Co.,^18 Cal. 3d 406, 413 (1976).
Actual malice requires a stronger showing than mere
negligence.

See St. Amant v. Thompson, 390 U.S. 727, 731 (1968).

The St. Amant court found that reckless disregard is not measured
by the reasonable person standard, but rather the defendant must
have "entertained serious doubts as to the truth of" the charges
Id.

Even an irresponsible and uncaring attitude, not rising to

the level of ill will, is not enough to prove actual malice.

See

Schwartz v. Worrall Publications, Inc., 610 A.2d 425, 430 (N.J.
1992).
Khawar provided expert testimony claiming that the Globe
reporter who wrote the story did not meet the professional
standards of a reporter.

(R.T. 831.)

This is irrelevant

however, as professional standards are not the controlling factor
in libel cases.

See Schwartz, 610 A.2d at 430.

Careless and

irresponsible behavior that amounts to a breach of journalistic

standards is not even sufficient to present the issue of actual
malice to the jury.

See Schwartz, 610 A.2d at 430.

In fact,

"egregious deviation" from professional standards is only
circumstantial evidence of actual malice.

See Hinerman v.—

Gazette Co., 423 S.E.2d 560, 573 (W. Va. 1992), cert, denied, 507
U.S. 960 (1993).
Khawar also contends that Globe did not perform a thorough
investigation into the assassination or the accusations made by
Morrow.

However, "mere proof of failure to investigate

establish actual malice.

See Gertz, 418 U.S. at 332.

cannot
S^ also

V

Johnson v. Southwestern Newspapers Corp., 855 S.W.2d 182, 188
(Tex. Ct. App. 1993).

This evidence is irrelevant because it

does not make the defendant any more likely to have had serious
doubts as to the truth of the statements.
U.S. at 732-33,

See St_._Amar^, 390

The Globe conducted an investigation.

1104-11, 1120-21.)

(R.T.

The author interviewed Morrow in detail as to

the claims made in his book,

(R.T. 1104-11.)/ and attempted to

contact the subject of the article, Ali Ahmand.

(R.T. 1120-21.)

Since failure to investigate cannot establish actual malice, the
claim that the investigation was not thorough is not probative
either.

See St. Amant, 390 U.S. at 732-33.

Khawar presented evidence that there was ample information
available about the assassination of Robert Kennedy, and that
anyone who wanted to inquire could have found the accusations to
be without merit.

(R.T. 690-702.)
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A plaintiff cannot prove

actual malice by showing "that defendants failed to avail
themselves of available means for ascertaining the falsity of the
statements."
1994).

Varner v. Bryan, 440 S.E.2d 295, 297 (N.C. Ct. App.

Again, this evidence does not attempt to establish that

the defendants had serious doubts as to the truth of the
statements in the article.

See id.

This evidence instead goes

to the question of negligence, which is not probative of actual
malice.

See id.

At trial, Khawar argued that Globe did not make a sufficient
attempt to contact him to get his side of the story.
21.)

(R.T. 1120-

However, failure to contact the subject of a story is not

actual malice, even where it would serve some purpose.

See

Reuber v. Food Chem. News, Inc., 925 F.2d 703, 715-17 (4th Cir.
1991), cert, denied, 501 U.S. 1212 (1991).

There is no

requirement when publishing a story to get the subject's side.
See id.
story.

Globe made an attempt to contact the subject of the
(R.T. 1120-21.)

under no duty to do so.

However, even if they didn't, they are
See Reuber, 925 F.2d at 715-17.

Failure

to contact the subject of the story is at most a breach of
journalistic professional standards, which makes it irrelevant
towards the issue of actual malice.

See Schwartz, 610 A.2d at

430.
Khawar attempted to show many deficiencies in the quality of
the reporting by Globe.

(R.T. 690-702, 831, 1020-21, 1104-11.)

However, even if Khawar proved all of his claims, it would have
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I
only proved negligence on the part of Globe, rather than the
I

reckless disregard required for actual malice.
A.2d at 430.

^ Schwartz, 610

Khawar failed to make any showing that could amount

to actual malice, and therefore the award of punitive damages
must be reversed.
AND HAS FAILED
III. SINCE KHAWAR IS AN INVOLUNTARY PUBLIC FIGURE ANY AWARD OF
TO PROVE ACTUAL MALICE ON THE PART OF GLOBE,
DAMAGES SHOULD BE REVERSED.
A public figure can not recover any damages without proving
actual malice.
775 (1986).

See Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc.., 475 U.S. 767,

As previously discussed, a plaintiff cannot recover

punitive damages without a showing of actual malice.

Public

figures cannot recover actual damages without this same showing
of actual malice.

See Curtis Publ'q Co. v. But^, 388 U.S 130,

154 (1967).
Khawar is an involuntary public figure.

Since Khawar's

complaints, if proved, would only amount to negligence, he has
failed to prove actual malice.

Therefore Khawar has not made the

necessary showing to recover any damages against Globe.

The

judgment against Globe should thus be reversed.
IV.

THIS COURT SHOULD ADOPT THE NEUTRAL REPORTAGE PRIVILEGE IN
LIBEL ACTIONS.
The question whether to apply the neutral reportage

privilege is a question of law.

See_^

Hill v. City of Lon^

Beach, 33 Cal. App. 4th 1684 (1995) (holding that the issue of
whether state law or contract principles applied to dismissal of
civil employee is a question of law).
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On review, an appellate

court is not bound by a lower court determination on questions of

I

law.

See Hill, 33 Cal. App. 4th at 1687.
A.

First Amendment free speech compels the adoption of the
neutral reportage privilege.

The United States Supreme Court first used constitutional
free speech protections to limit state defamation law in New York
Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964).

The Court held that

even when a defendant's remarlcs are both false and defamatory,
the plaintiff must prove by clear and convincing evidence that
the remarks were made with actual malice or with reckless
disregard for the truth when the remarks are directed at a public
official.

See id. at 279-80.

The need to protect criticism of

public officials and speech regarding issues of political concern
motivated the decision.

See id. at 271-72.

Debate on matters of

public concern "should be uninhibited, robust, and wide-open,
.

.

.

[although] it may well include vehement, caustic, and

sometimes unpleasantly sharp attacks on government and public
officials."

Id. at 270.

Following Sullivan, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals
articulated the neutral reportage privilege for the first time.
See Edwards v. National Audubon Society, Inc., 556 F.2d 113 (2d
Cir. 1977), cert, denied sub nom Edwards v. New York Times Co.,
434 U.S. 1002 (1977).

The issue in Edwards was whether the New

York Times was liable for publishing an article accurately
reporting accusations made by the National Audubon Society.
at 117.

I^

Audubon Society officials alleged that five scientists

were "paid liars" with regard to the effects of DDT on birds.
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Edwards, 556 F.2d at 117.

The New York Times republished the

accusations in the midst of a pre-existing public controversy
Qver the use of DDT.

See id. at 115.

On these facts, the Second Circuit found that the New York
Times was constitutionally privileged against a libel judgment.
See id. at 120,

The court stated that "when a responsible,

prominent organization like the National Audubon Society makes
serious charges against a public figure, the First Amendment
protects the accurate and disinterested reporting of those
charges, regardless of the reporter's private views regarding
their validity."

Id. ^ The reasons the Second Circuit had for

adopting the neutral reportage privilege echoed the concerns
elucidated by the U.S. Supreme Court that debate on issues of
public concern be "uninhibited, robust, and wide-open.
Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 270.

The Second Circuit concluded that

"[t]he public interest in being fully informed about
controversies that often rage around sensitive issues demands
that the press be afforded the freedom to report such charges
without assuming responsibility for them."

Edwards, 556 F.2d at

120.
Subsequent to the Edwards case, the Second Circuit further
defined the bounds of the neutral reportage privilege.

See

Cianci v. New Times Publ'q Co., 639 F.2d 54, 69 {2d Cir. 1980).
The court added a qualification that the privilege does not
protect a reporter who "in fact espouses or concurs in the
charges made by others, or who deliberately distorts these
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statements to launch a personal attack of his own on a public
figure."

Cianci, 639 F.2d at 69.

Since the Second Circuit first adopted the neutral reportage
privilege, other jurisdictions have expanded the doctrine on
constitutional grounds.

See, e.q., Barry v. Time, Inc., 584 F.

Supp. 1110, 1126 (N.D. Cal. 1984).

In a decision often cited by

courts adopting the privilege, the United States District Court
for the Northern District of California removed the requirement
that the origin of the defamatory material be a responsible
source.

See id.

The Barry case involved republished accusations

by a professional basketball player against his former college
coach.

Id. at 1112.

The player accused the coach of

transferring money to the player in violation of NCT^ rules.
id.

See

The federal district court reasoned that enforcing a

requirement that the source of the accusation be responsible
would be inconsistent with the primary reason behind the neutral
reportage privilege.

See id. at 1126.

The driving force behind the neutral reportage doctrine is
the public interest in being informed.

See id.

Requiring

reporters to ascertain the responsibility or trustworthiness of a
source would have an impermissible chilling effect on the
dissemination of information.

See id.

The relative

trustworthiness of the original source is not important, as long
as the report is neutral and accurate.

See id. at 1126-27.

Prominence is only important to the Barry court in so far as it
allows the public to better judge the truth of the allegations.
Id. at 1125-26.

The court distinguishes a case in which the
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privilege did not apply because the accusers were unnamed, and
therefore the public had no means of judging the veracity of the
allegations.

Barry, 584 F. Supp. at 1125-26.

In Barry, the

court recognized that the public should be the judge of
credibility in public controversies, and to that end, the neutral
reportage privilege does not require the original source to be
responsible.

Id. at 1126-27.

The United States District Court for the District of
Columbia went further than the court in Barry, and removed the
requirement that the source of the charges be prominent.

See In

re United Press Int'i; 106 B.R. 323, 329

"[A]

(D.D.C. 1989).

limitation to the reiteration of statements of 'responsible
'prominent'

or

'defamers' is inconsistent with the [reason for

being] of the doctrine."

Id *

The charges in United—Press—Int—1

concerned accusations by an ordinary citizen that the plaintiff
was a leader of organized crime on the island of Hawaii, and the
court held that United Press International was protected by the
neutral reportage privilege.

Id. at 323-25.

The United Press Int'I court reasoned that a prominence
requirement was an assurance of trustworthiness, and relying on
Barry, determined that trustworthiness is not a prerequisite to
invoking the neutral reportage privilege.

Id. at 330 n.l6.

Requiring reporters to ascertain the veracity of their sources
would chill speech on controversial issues.
Supp. at 1126.

Bee Barry, 584 F.

A trustworthiness requirement, in the form of a

prominent and responsible source, is inconsistent with the goal
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of open debate which is at the heart of the neutral reportage
privilege.

See United Press Int'l, 106 B.R. at 330.

In Barry, the court also reasoned that the neutral reportage
privilege is constitutionally compelled due to the inadequate
protection afforded by the actual malice requirement.
F. Supp. at 1124.

Barry, 584

Pending defamation suits have a chilling

effect on the press, and the quick resolution of such suits
serves First Amendment free speech concerns.

See id.

Courts

applying the neutral reportage privilege can resolve cases at the
summary judgment stage, which lessens the chilling effect
defamation actions have on free speech.

See id.

In contrast,

the issue of actual malice must go to trial, see Hutchinson v.
Proxmire, 443 U.S. Ill, 120 n.9 (1979), thereby exacting a higher
cost on First Amendment freedoms.
The neutral reportage doctrine addresses the United States
Supreme Court's First Amendment concern for "uninhibited, robust,
and wide-open" debate on public issues.
270.

Sullivan, 376 U.S. at

"If neutrality is maintained, the public . . . can serve as

the final arbiter of the trustworthiness of the defamer and his
statements .

.

. The First Amendment demands no less."

United

Press Int'l, 106 B.R. at 330.
B.

This Court should adopt the neutral reportage privilege
under the California Constitution.

Since the Second Circuit Edwards decision, a number of
jurisdictions have adopted the neutral reportage privilege,
including the Eighth Circuit, see Janklow v. Newsweek, Inc., 788
F. 2d 1300 {8th Cir. 1985)(en banc), cert, denied, 479 U.S. 883

31

(1986), and many federal district courts.
F. Supp. at 1126.

Se^ e^, Bar^,

Other jurisdictions have rejected the

privilege, see, e.g.. Young v. The Morning Journal, 669 N.E.2d
1136 (Ohio 1996), or have not addressed the issue.

Neither the

Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals nor the United States Supreme
Court have decided whether to apply the neutral reportage
privilege.
Since the United States Supreme Court has not addressed the
neutral reportage privilege, there is no binding precedent upon
this Court.

However, "the California Constitution provides

independent protection for free speech and in certain contexts
exceeds the protection provided by the First Amendment to the
United States Constitution."

Marcias v. Hartwell, 55 Cal. App.

4th 669, 675 (1997)(citing Robins v. Pruneyard Shopping Ctr^, 23
Cal. 3d 899 (1979), aff^d, 447 U.S. 74 (1980)).

In Robir^, this

Court recognized the right of citizens to collect signatures for
a petition at a privately owned mall.

Robins, 23 Cal. 3d at 910.

The United States Supreme Court upheld this Court's decision,
holding that states have the ability to adopt civil liberties in
their own constitutions more expansive than the rights guaranteed
in the United States Constitution.

Pruneyard Shopping Ctr.

v, Robins, 447 U.S. 74, 81 (1980).
This Court stated that property rights must in certain
circumstances yield to free speech rights.
3d at 906-08.

^ Robins, 23 Cal.

In Robins, this Court acknowledged that

[a]

protective provision more definitive and inclusive than the First
Amendment is contained in our state constitutional guarantee of
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the right of free speech and press.

Robins> 23 Cal. 3d at 908

(quoting Wilson v. Superior Court, 13 Cal, 3d 652, 658 (1975)).
This Court recognized the importance of the right to petition in
shaping the political and social landscape.
The neutral reportage privilege addresses the same concern
for keeping citizens involved in public issues.

In first

articulating the doctrine, the Second Circuit cited the "public
interest in being fully informed about controversies that often
rage around sensitive issues."

Edwards, 556 F.2d at 120.

The

"more definitive and inclusive" protection provided by the
California Constitution, Robins, 23 Cal. 3d at 908, must embrace
these concerns, especially in light of the importance this Court
put on the right of citizens to petition the government.
This Court recognized that property rights must give way to
free speech rights in matters concerning the ability of the
people to participate in our democracy.
at 906-08.

See Robins, 23 Cal. 3d

Likewise, privacy rights must surrender to free

speech rights in the context of the neutral reportage privilege.
In a decision applying the neutral reportage privilege, the
Illinois Court of Appeals noted the importance of free press to a
free society, stating "[t]he ultimate sovereign in this country
is an informed citizenry."

Krauss v. Champaign News Gazette,

Inc., 375 N.E.2d 1362 (Ill. App. Ct. 1978).

This Court should

uphold the role of the public to function as the ultimate
sovereign, and should adopt the neutral reportage privilege under
the broad free speech protections of the California Constitution.
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V.

THE NEUTRAL REPORTAGE PRIVILEGE APPLIES TO GLOBE S
REPUBLICATION OF MORROW'S CHARGES.

A.

The neutral reportage privilege protects Globe even
nnder the stricter Second Circuit test if this Court
finds that Khawar was a public figure.

Under the Second Circuit neutral reportage standard, a
report must meet a four part test for the privilege to apply.
Edwards v. National Audubon Soc'y, Inc., 556 F.2d 113, 120 (2d
Cir. 1977), cert, denied sub nom Edwards v. New York Times Co.,
434 U.S. 1002 (1977);

Cianci v. New Times Publ*g Co., 639 F. 2d

54, 69 (2d Cir. 1980).

The requirements are that the plaintiff

is a public figure, the report is neutral and accurate, and the
V

source of the defamatory material is responsible and prominent.
See Edwards, 556 F.2d at 120.

Additionally, the publisher must

not concur in or espouse the charges.
69.

See Cianci, 639 F.2d at

If Khawar is a public figure for the limited purpose of the

Kennedy assassination, the case at bar meets the other parts of
this strict test.
Globe's publication meets the requirement that the report be
neutral and accurate.

The trial jury specifically found the

article to be neutral and accurate,
supports this finding.

(C.T. 2782), and the record

Fifteen of the eighteen paragraphs in the

article contained language indicating that Morrow made the
claims, one paragraph stated an undisputed fact,

(C.T. 3145), and

the remaining paragraphs of the report were direct quotations
from Morrow or his book.

(R.T. 1104.)

The picture in the

article was taken from Morrow's book, and the caption also
ascribed the charges to Morrow.

(C.T. 3145.)
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The article does

not endorse Morrow's accusations, but merely republishes them.
"Unless it is shown that the journalist deliberately distorts
[the charges] to launch a personal attack of his own , . . that
which he reports under such circumstance is privileged."

Krauss

V. Champaign News Gazette, Inc., 375 N.E.2d 1362 (Ill. App. Ct.
1978).

There is no evidence in the record that Globe distorted

the charges Morrow made, and therefore the report is neutral and
accurate.
Morrow was a responsible and prominent source with respect
to the assassination of Robert Kennedy.
Morrow was a former CIA operative,

The record shows that

(R.T. 809.)

Morrow had

published a previous book entitled Betrayal, concerning the
assassination of John Kennedy, the publication of which made
possible the creation of the House Select Committee on
Assassinations.

(R.T. 841.)

The court in Edwards determined

that the National Audubon Society was a prominent and responsible
source concerning the controversy around DDT and birds.
Edwards 556 F.2d at 120.

See

A federal district court found that a

law firm with ties to the Greek-American community was a
responsible and prominent source with regard to allegations
against a Greek airline.
517 (S.D.N.Y. 1997).

Coliniatis v Dimas, 965 F. Supp. 511,

Likewise, Morrow was a prominent figure on

the subject of assassinations, and he qualifies as a prominent
and responsible source concerning Robert Kennedy's assassination.
Globe's report also meets the last prong of the test
found in Cianci, that the author must not endorse the republished
charges.

Cianci, 639 F.2d at 69.

35

As previously discussed, every

paragraph in the article attributes the charges to Morrow in some
way.

(C.T. 3145;

R.T. 1104.)

The Coliniatis court cited a

similar factor in finding that a publisher did not endorse
defamatory charges, stating that "[e]ven the headline of the
article states that the allegations are made by 'lawyers of the
company.'"

Coliniatis, 965 F. Supp. at 516.

Should this Court

determine that Khawar was a public figure, Globe's report meets
all parts of the strict Second Circuit test.
B.

If Khawar is a limited purpose public figure—the
neutral reportage privilege protects Globe under the
standard articulated since the Barry ca^.
V

The Barry court and those which followed it applied the
Second Circuit neutral reportage test, but without the
requirement of a responsible and prominent source.

Barry v.

Time, Inc., 584 F, Supp. 1110, 1126-27 (N.D. Cal- 1984).

S^e

also In re United Press Int'l, 106 B.R. 323, 329 (D.D.C. 1989).
However, this line of cases included the requirement that the
report must concern an existing newsworthy controversy.
Barry, 584 F. Supp. at 1126.

See

As previously discussed, the

Globe's article was neutral and accurate, and Globe did not
concur in or espouse the charges against Khawar.

There was an

existing, newsworthy controversy surrounding the assassination of
Robert Kennedy, and should this court determine Khawar was a
public figure, the Globe's report meets the test articulated in
Barry and its progeny.
Globe's report concerned a newsworthy controversy.

In spite

of the fact that a court convicted Sirhan Sirhan of Kennedy's
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assassination,

(C.T. 3145,)# a live controversy existed

concerning the assassination.

The evidence in the record shows

that Robert Blair Kaiser published a book questioning the
circumstances of the Senator's death.

(R.T. 1409.)

Khawar

testified that he had often seen himself on television in
programs on the assassination.

(R.T. 1393.)

Robert Blair Kaiser

testified at trial that he had attended a conference on the
assassinations of John Kennedy, Robert Kennedy, and Martin Luther
King in 1993.

(R.T. 2149.)

Robert Kennedy was a United States

Senator, was running for president at the time of his death, and
was a prominent public figure.

These factors indicate there was

a live controversy over Kennedy's assassination.

The report

meets the requirement that it be in the context of a newsworthy
controversy, as well as the other parts of the post-Barry test.
C.

Globe is protected under a broader privilege which does
not require the plaintiff to be a public figure.

Since the Second Circuit first articulated the neutral
reportage privilege in Edwards, courts have applied it to cases
involving private, as well as public figures.
Coliniatis, 965 F. Supp. at 513-14.

See, e.q.,

The United States District

Court for the Southern District of New York held the neutral
reportage privilege applicable in a case involving the employee
of an airline.

See id.

The Coliniatis case concerned

allegations that the plaintiff was involved in an illegal
kickback scheme.

Id.

Although the court found that the

plaintiff was a public figure for purposes of malice, it applied
the neutral reportage privilege without regard to the public
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figure status of the plaintiff.

See Coliniatis^ 965 F. Supp. at

517-19.
The factors the Coliniatis court considered were whether the
defamatory statement was "in the context of (1) 'an accurate and
disinterested report;

(2) regarding a newsworthy controversy;

(3)

in which the defamatory statement was made by a 'responsible,
prominent organization';

and (4) provided the statement is not

endorsed by the publisher."

Id. at 519 {quoting Levin v. McPhee,

917 F. Supp. 230, 239 {S.D.N.Y. 1996), aff'd, 119 F.3d 189 (2d
Cir. 1997)).

As previously discussed, Globe's report was neutral

and accurate, and Morrow qualified as a prominent and responsible
source.

Additionally, there was a newsworthy controversy

surrounding Kennedy's assassination, and Globe did not endorse
the charges.

Under this standard, Globe's republication of

Morrow's charges is protected by the neutral reportage privilege.
CONCLUSION
Khalid Khawar went to the Ambassador Hotel on the night of
June 5, 1968, with the intention of having his picture taken near
Robert Kennedy.

After intentionally giving his camera to a

friend he got up on the podium a few steps from the Senator where
he posed for the camera.
assassinated.

Shortly thereafter, Robert Kennedy was

Time published a photograph of Khawar standing

near Robert Kennedy just before the assassination.
this same photograph to thousands of people.

Khawar showed

Khawar's own

actions combined with bad luck and the unfortunate circumstances
of that night made Khawar an involuntary public figure.
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Because Khawar made no showing of actual malice, as a public
figure he cannot recover on grounds of libel.

Even if Khawar is

a private individual, his failure to prove actual malice
precludes recovery of punitive damages.
In addition this Court should adopt the neutral reportage
privilege, which is compelled by the United States and California
Constitutions.

This privilege protects Globe because its report

was neutral and accurate, Khawar is an involuntary limited
purpose public figure, and the charges concerned a newsworthy
controversy.
The judgment against Globe on grounds of libel should be
reversed and judgment entered in favor of Globe.

Alternatively,

any award of punitive damages must be reversed.

Dated:

October 29, 1997

Respectfully submitted.
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